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Despite the planned increases in military expenditure in Poland 
and Sweden following the Ukraine crisis, the legitimate question 
being asked of governments across Europe is whether the European 
Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) is sustainable in 
the face of diminishing defence budgets and investment in defence 
research and development (R&D). However highly one might 
rank the importance of security and defence, the reality is that 
governments have to make difficult decisions as to how national 
budgets should be spent. Nevertheless, the need to maintain the 
military as a public good has not escaped the attention of heads of 
government, and they have in some cases embarked on collective 
ventures to make existing budgets more efficient and effective. A 
number of suggestions have been made in this regard.
For example, Huxham and Rempling (2013) have called for the use 
of the Lisbon Treaty’s ‘Start-Up Fund’ as a way of sustaining military 
capabilities in the European Union (EU). In advance of the December 
2013 European Council meeting on defence, the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) (2013) called for a VAT exemption for Agency-
run projects. The European Commission is also pushing forward 
with ways to make better use of the EU’s structural and regional 
development funds for projects that are dual-use in nature. A 
number of EU Member States are also looking at ways to cut defence 
costs, including the privatisation of procurement procedures, 
private finance initiatives and private-public partnerships.
Continuing in this vein, this Policy Brief argues that the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) could potentially finance certain defence-
industrial initiatives in the EU. When this author first raised this idea 
in the middle of 2013 it may have sounded outlandish (Fiott, 2013; 
Fiott, 2014). Yet numerous individuals, groups and even institutional 
actors have in the meantime echoed this suggestion (EDTA, 2013; 
SESAR, 2013: p. 3; Coelmont and Biscop, 2014). Indeed, the draft 
conclusions of the European Council meeting in December 2013 
specifically invited the European Commission and the EDA to draw 
‘on the financial expertise of the [EIB]’, even though this line was 
dropped for the final conclusions (Council of the EU, 2013: p. 7). 
This Policy Brief builds on this author’s initial suggestion by looking 
Financing research and development programmes have never been more expensive 
in Europe. Defence budgets are on the wane, 
international competition is fierce and high-end 
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and support for SMEs, especially where regional 
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at the benefits of involving the EIB in the European defence sector, 
and, in turn, at the obstacles barring its greater involvement in 
the sector.
The European Investment Bank
The EIB is owned by, and works in the interests of, the EU Member 
States. With over €242 billion of available capital, the EIB made 
project loans totaling €71.7 billion in 2013 – this amount is 
more than the combined total of French and German defence 
expenditures in 2012. The EIB principally finances up to 50% 
of total costs for public and private projects that exceed €25 
million in value: all projects must be economically, financially 
and technically feasible and environmentally sound. Loans are 
specifically aimed at addressing economic/social disparities and 
to promote economic knowledge, skills and innovation in the 
European economy. The EIB can finance projects on a one-off 
and fixed-term basis, and it has issued loans to public sector 
bodies to finance regeneration projects for infrastructure, 
energy, transport and urban renovation. The EIB, along with the 
European Commission and participating public/private banks 
and institutions, is also a shareholder in the European Investment 
Fund (EIF). The Fund has a range of financial products to offer 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
In-line with EU industrial policy, the EIB can directly issue loans 
to SMEs or it can make loans through public bodies (called 
intermediated loans). The Bank also offers a range of specially 
designed financing vehicles. For example, it can offer guarantees 
and securitisation to businesses so that projects can be made 
more attractive to other investors. Alternatively, it can offer 
structured finance for higher risk projects in the knowledge 
economy and for SMEs; the Structured Finance Facility is 
valued at a maximum of €3.75 billion. Additionally, the Risk 
Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF), which is jointly run by the EIB 
and Commission, provides a maximum of €10 billion in loans, 
guarantees and investment for complex, long-term and public/
private research, development and innovation projects such as 
applied or industrial research, feasibility studies, experimental 
development and pilot projects.
Furthermore, there are a number of finance and loan vehicles 
made available through the European Investment Fund. The EIF 
specialises in venture capital investment for SMEs and the EIB 
holds a 62.1% stake in the Fund, along with the Commission 
(which represents the EU with a 30% stake) and a number of 
private banks (a total stake of 7.9%). The EIF comprises two 
financing vehicles. Firstly, the Joint European Resources for 
Micro to Medium Enterprises (JEREMIE) allows national and 
regional authorities to redeploy part of their structural funds 
into market-driven financial instruments. Serving as a “holding 
fund”, JEREMIE can offer guarantees, equity guarantees, micro-
loans, etc. to SMEs through the EIF. Secondly, the EIF sets up 
and advises venture capital funds in close collaboration with 
the EIB, European Commission, Member States and regional 
authorities. The EIF provides risk capital to fund managers for 
SMEs developing projects that use advanced technologies.
Supporting Defence-Relevant R&D and Regional Smart 
Specialisation
Many of the aforementioned products and facilities potentially 
offer financing options for the European defence industry, albeit 
in very specific ways. For example, while the EU’s structural funds 
and budget comprise an important element in the development 
of dual-use projects and support to SMEs, these instruments 
cannot be used for ‘purely’ military projects. As stated in the 
Lisbon Treaty, however, there are no (at least theoretically 
speaking) obstacles to the EIB and the EIF being used for ‘pure’ 
defence programmes. As Article 309 of the consolidated version 
of the treaties states: ‘[t]he Bank shall, operating on a non-profit-
making basis, grant loans and give guarantees which facilitate 
the financing of […] projects in all sectors of the economy’ 
(emphasis added). Article 309(b) specifically refers to projects 
that seek to modernise, convert or develop fresh activities that 
benefit “the establishment or functioning of the internal market”, 
especially where these projects refer to the “common interest” of 
several Member States. This certainly applies to those elements 
of Europe’s defence sector that are increasingly seen as falling 
under the internal market.
In this regard, a key role the EIB could play is to sure up the 
attractiveness of defence-relevant SMEs to other investors. 
Intermediated loans and guarantees and securitisation initiatives 
could lend credibility and resources to SMEs seeking investment 
to develop innovative dual-use projects. More importantly, 
intermediated loans could be used to encourage civilian SMEs 
to engage in defence-relevant R&D and demonstrator projects. 
Such an initiative could tick the boxes of promoting economic 
knowledge, skills and innovation and it could eventually also 
enhance the international competitiveness of those SMEs 
involved in such R&D programmes.
There are additional opportunities afforded by the EIB’s and EIF’s 
funding schemes. For example, the Risk Sharing Finance Facility 
could assist with public/private dual-use research – i.e. both at 
the stages of invention (the R&T-phase) and applied research (the 
R&D-phase). With the RSFF’s €10 billion loan ceiling, a number 
of defence-relevant projects could be developed. For example, 
Taranis – a Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) being developed 
by the British Ministry of Defence and firms such as BAE Systems 
– has so far cost £185 million (approx. €230 million) (BAE 
Systems, 2014). The spin-off technologies that derive from such 
projects may eventually benefit the commercial sector and lead 
to the type of profits that can be used to repay investment loans.
Additionally, regional clusters specialising in industrial niches 
(also known as “clusters of excellence”) could benefit from EIB/
EIF involvement. Such clusters are premised on the idea that 
large firms, SMEs and research centres are combined in close 
geographic proximity in order to increase R&D collaboration and 
specialise in a specific technology area (e.g. aircraft engines). 
Financial and political investment in these clusters are critical 
if defence firms are to commercialise their technologies, 
internationalise their business and to benefit from the structural 
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funds. Smart specialisation is a pre-condition for access to 
structural funds. While the decision to prioritise regional 
clusters rests in the hands of local and regional government 
actors, EIB financing could lead to successful technology 
demonstrator projects and the development of industrial and 
scientific partnerships between firms and research centres. Such 
investment could have positive knock-on effects for regional 
skills development, high-tech knowledge base and scientific/
industrial interdisciplinarity.
The EIB is no panacea
While the EIB potentially offers a range of useful instruments 
there are a number of obstacles barring their application in the 
defence industry. Quite obviously, finances from the EIB cannot 
fill the gaping holes in the defence budgets of Member States. 
Neither can EIB loans be used to maintain and acquire new military 
equipment and capabilities. Under the Bank’s understanding 
these would not be categorised as investments and it would be 
politically sensitive to do so. Furthermore, EIB loans could not be 
used to supplement the operational budgets of the EDA, unless 
they are channeled to projects run by the Agency. The intrinsic 
nature of loans and investments is that they need repaying (with 
interest); defence, as a public good, does not always result in the 
kind of returns necessary to service loans.
There are some further, more specific, restrictions to involving 
the EIB. First, the EIB can only make loans for projects that ‘are 
of such a size or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by 
the various means available in the individual’ member states. 
In essence, should member states want to draw on EIB loans 
they would have to demonstrate that they do not have their own 
funds (on a national and collective basis). Whether states would 
be prepared to put up the other 50% of the funds needed for EIB 
participation in projects over €25 million remains to be seen.
Second, any idea to develop a JEREMIE-style initiative for ‘pure’ 
defence initiatives would surely fail given that it would rest on 
employing unused structural funds for loans and guarantees. 
However, as stated earlier, only dual-use projects would benefit 
from JEREMIE-style guarantees, equity guarantees, micro-loans, 
etc.
Third, any EIB loans would come with interest payments and 
sundry expenses (e.g. legal costs, project-appraisal, etc.). While 
the EIB offers both fixed interest and variable rate loans, all rates 
are ‘quote-specific’ following a project appraisal and agreement 
on the loan period, the amount borrowed, and the currency of 
the loan. The application for an EIB loan may, once all costs have 
been considered, be more expensive than funding an initiative 
via central government.1
Fourth, experience from the United States shows that defence-
industry access to capital markets is greatly enhanced when 
the risk of an initial outlay by a lender is offset by a coherent 
strategic plan for long-term investments (Levy, 2011: p. 2). 
Unfortunately, in the EU there is no long-term vision for defence 
investment and so the risk involved in funding defence-relevant 
projects is higher.
Fifth, the EIB prefers to deal under open procurement procedures, 
and takes seriously the EU’s principles on public procurement: 
equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency. The EIB 
therefore favours competitive tendering (based on cost and 
quality) for project proposals, which, despite the provisions of 
the EU Directive on defence procurement (2009/81/EC), could be 
a big hurdle in the EU defence-sector where open procurement 
is not the norm. For example, from August 2011 to March 2013 
only 3% of total contracts awarded under the procurement 
Directive were cross-border in nature (European Commission, 
2013: p. 15). Additionally, transparency in defence procurement 
is challenging given the sensitivity involved in classified defence 
R&D. 
Finally, loans made under the EIB are not free from political 
considerations. Indeed, the EIB Board of Directors is principally 
composed of Member State representatives and a Commission 
representative. The EIB is an independent institution but its 
shareholders are the Member States. France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Europe’s major defence-
industrial players) contribute approximately 76% towards the 
EIB’s capital base of €242 billion (EIB, 2013). These states are 
likely to be reticent about what EIB support will entail. Therefore, 
it is little wonder that heads of government dropped any 
reference to the Bank in the final conclusions of the December 
2013 European Council on defence.
Conclusion
Despite the sensitivities and obstacles involved in drawing on 
the EIB for defence-industrial initiatives, there is still scope for 
the Bank to play a positive role. It is principally the European 
Commission, given its connections to the EIB and its 30% take 
in the EIF, that can make the case for greater involvement of 
the Bank in European defence. Building on its policies aimed at 
SMEs and regional smart specialisation, the Commission could 
– within the boundaries of the obstacles mentioned in this 
Brief – investigate the ways in which the EIB might play a role 
in promoting economic knowledge, skills and innovation in the 
European defence sector. 
Without careful consideration of the sensibilities and reservations 
held by a number of Member States however, the European 
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defence industry should not bank on support from the EIB 
anytime soon.
Notes
1 I am indebted to Alexander Mattelaer for bringing the issue of 
interest rates to my attention
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